Abstract Goeree and Holt (2001) experimentally study a number of games. In each case they initially …nd strong support for Nash equilibrium, however by changing an apparently irrelevant parameter they …nd results which contradict Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we study the …ve normal form games from Goeree and Holt (2001). We argue that their results may be explained by the hypothesis that subjects view their opponents' behaviour as ambiguous. Ambiguity-aversion causes players to avoid strategies which give low out of equilibrium pay-o¤s. Similarly ambiguity-preference can make strategies with high pay-o¤s more attractive.
INTRODUCTION
Nash equilibrium (henceforth NE) is the most widely used equilibrium concept in game theory. A large and growing number of experimental studies indicate its weaknesses. Goeree and Holt (2001) (henceforth GH) published an article with the provocative title "Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive Contradictions"in which they claim that "for each of these ten games there is an experimental treatment in which behaviour conforms nicely to predictions of NE" but where "a change in the payo¤ structure produces a large inconsistency between theoretical predictions and observed behaviour". 1 In the present paper we restrict attention to the …ve one-shot games, which GH studied. We argue that many of the "inconsistencies"can be explained by strategic ambiguity.
Ambiguity describes situations where individuals cannot or do not assign subjective probabilities to uncertain events. This may be because the decision problem is complex or unfamiliar. There is by now considerable experimental evidence which shows that individuals treat ambiguous decisions di¤erently from risks with known probabilities. The best known example is the Ellsberg paradox, Ellsberg (1961) .
2 There is also experimental evidence that behaviour in games is a¤ected by ambiguity. Colman and Pulford (2007) present experimental evidence that ambiguity a¤ects behaviour in games but do not test any particular theories. Eichberger and Kelsey (2002) show that the comparative static e¤ects of changes in ambiguity in games of strategic complements are the opposite of those in games of strategic substitutes. Eichberger et al (2008) test this prediction experimentally and …nd the evidence is broadly supportive.
Although there are many other explanations of the deviations from NE in the GH experiments, among others Quantal Response Equilibrium, McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) , and level-k rationality, Stahl and Wilson (1995) , it is interesting to consider an explanation in terms of ambiguity. Firstly it is intuitively appealing that ambiguity in ‡uences behaviour both in the economy and laboratory experiments. Secondly our theory is related to the large decision theoretic literature on ambiguity. This establishes a connection with a rigorous axiomatic decision theory. As a result one can work with a theory whose general properties are well known. It su¢ ces to modify standard rationality conditions in individual decisions and games to allow for ambiguity. The usual independence axiom has been relaxed to only apply to comonotonic acts. Moreover the link to the extant experimental literature on ambiguity enables us to use robust experimental results in order to make predictions about strategic behaviour under ambiguity.
In GH's experiments each game was only played once, which means that subjects were unlikely to be familiar with the game or the behaviour of their opponents. In such conditions subjects are more likely to perceive ambiguity about the behaviour of the other players. In addition, some of these experi-ments concerned coordination games with multiple Nash equilibria. Thus for any given player, there will typically be two or more strategies associated with di¤erent equilibria which his/her opponent can play. Uncertainty about which NE will be played is another possible source of ambiguity.
In this paper, each player views the strategy choice by his/her opponents as potentially ambiguous. We use a model of uncertainty axiomatized by Chateauneuf et al (2007) , (henceforth CEG) , in which ambiguity is represented by non-additive beliefs. In the context of games, this implies that players will maximize a weighted average of the equilibrium pay-o¤, the best pay-o¤ and the worst pay-o¤ for any given strategy. Thus players may react to ambiguity partly in an optimistic way by over-weighting good outcomes and partly in a pessimistic way by over-weighting bad outcomes. Using estimates of the parameters relating to ambiguity and ambiguity-attitude from the experimental literature, we can calibrate our model of the players. Thus, on the one hand, relaxing the independence axiom and on the other hand, constraining the ambiguity parameters by restricting them to robust values found in the experimental literature we are able to explain the GH results for normal form games.
We do not view our results in this paper as the exclusive explanation for the observations about the behaviour in games reported by GH. We believe however that ambiguity about strategic behaviour is an important feature of interactive situations which are one-shot and/or are not repeated often enough to establish …rm patterns of behaviour. Ambiguity is modelled by relaxing the independence condition which creates additional free parameters. These can be estimated in experiments on individual decision-making under ambiguity. In this respect, we were surprised to …nd that restricting the estimated parameters would allow us to reproduce the observations which GH report for behaviour in their experiments in games.
Ideally, one would want to measure individual characteristics like ambiguityattitudes and the degree of ambiguity in a particular game directly for the individuals who will play the games. The way in which the ambiguity parameters have been estimated in the literature show how one can run experiments in which one determines …rst the ambiguity attitudes of the participants and then observes these people's behaviour in games. Performing such experiments is beyond the scope of this paper. Our results demonstrate the potential of strategic ambiguity to contribute to the explanation of behaviour in games and they suggest experimental designs for testing these hypotheses.
Organization of the Paper The next section describes our model of ambiguity in games. Subsection 2.1 will introduce these preferences, provide some intuition for the parameters of this model and point to the experimental literature, which tries to estimate them. Subsection 2.3 de…nes an Equilibrium under Ambiguity (EUA), the equilibrium notion which we shall use. In section 3 we argue that GH's results on one-shot games can be explained by ambiguity. In Section 4 we discuss competing theories and section 5 concludes. The appendix contains proofs of those results not proved in the text.
STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY
This section introduces our model of ambiguity and uses it as the basis of a solution concept for normal form games.
Non-additive beliefs
In the present paper we restrict attention to ambiguity in 2-player games, which requires the following notation. A 2-player game = hf1; 2g ; S 1 ; S 2 ; u 1 ; u 2 i consists of players, i = 1; 2, …nite pure strategy sets S i and payo¤ functions u i (s i ; s i ) for each player. The space of all strategy pro…les is denoted by S: The notation, s i ; denotes the strategy chosen by i's opponent. The set of all strategies for i's opponent is S i . We shall adopt the convention that female pronouns (she, her etc.) denote player 1 and male pronouns denote player 2. Beginning with Schmeidler (1989) , ambiguous beliefs have been modelled as capacities, which are similar to subjective probabilities except that they are not necessarily additive. We shall use a model of ambiguity from CEG, which has the advantage that it is parsimonious in the number of parameters. This theory represents beliefs by a neo-additive capacity de…ned by:
where ; 2 [0; 1]; is an additive probability distribution on S i and (A) := P s i2A
i (s i ). They show that preferences may be represented in the form:
where E u i (s i ; s i ) ; denotes a conventional expectation taken with respect to the probability distribution :
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One can interpret as the decision-maker's belief. However (s)he may not be fully con…dent in this belief. Thus it is an ambiguous belief. His/her con…dence is modelled by the weight (1 ) given to the expected payo¤ E u i (s i ; s i ) : Or equivalently can be interpreted as a measure of the ambiguity which the decision-maker perceives. The highest (resp. lowest) possible level of ambiguity corresponds to = 1; (resp. = 0). Ambiguity-attitude is measured by ; which represents the optimism/pessimism of the decision maker. Purely optimistic preferences are given by = 1; while the highest 3 Of course this convention is for convenience only and bears no relation to the actual gender of subjects in GH's experiments. 4 For simplicity, we will write, in slight abuse of notation, V i (s i ; ; ; ) instead of V i (s i ; ( j ; ; )) : level of pessimism occurs when = 0: If 0 < < 1; the individual is neither purely ambiguity-averse nor purely ambiguity-loving, since (s)he responds to ambiguity partly in an optimistic way by over-weighting good outcomes and partly in a pessimistic way by over-weighting bad outcomes.
A possible interpretation is that the optimism parameter, ; is a personal characteristic of the decision maker like his/her risk preferences. In contrast, the degree of ambiguity, ; may depend on the situation. In particular, one would expect there to be more ambiguity when players interact for the …rst time. Growing familiarity with the game and the behaviour of opponents is likely to reduce ambiguity.
CEG also show that these preferences may be represented in the multiple priors form:
where P := fp 2 (S i ) : p > (1 ) g : For the case of one opponent with three pure strategies, Figure 1 shows the set of probability distributions P( ; ):
The multiple priors representation in equation (1) can be interpreted as follows. When an individual perceives a situation as ambiguous (s)he considers more than one probability distribution to be possible. He/she reacts to ambiguity partly in an optimistic way by using the most favourable possible probability and partly in a pessimistic way by using the least favourable distribution. 
Evidence on Individual Decisions
This section presents a brief summary of the experimental evidence on individual decisions under uncertainty. First we discuss risks with known probabilities then we consider how these results are modi…ed in the presence of ambiguity. For risks with known probabilities, expected utility theory implies that individuals will maximize a weighted sum of the utilities, where the weights are equal to the probability of the relevant outcomes. However if individuals do not have expected utility preferences it is possible that these decision weights will di¤er from the probabilities. Tversky and Wakker (1995) study the relationship between decision weights and attitudes towards risk and characterize the possibility and certainty e¤ects. A majority of individuals appear to behave cautiously when there is ambiguity. Following Wakker (2001), who relates such behaviour to a generalized version of the Allais paradox, we shall refer to such cautious behaviour as pessimism. This article surveys the relevant experimental literature, which shows, that a minority of individuals respond to ambiguity in the opposite way, i.e. they display optimism.
Experiments on decision-making with known probabilities have shown that individuals tend to overweight both high and low probability events. As a result the decision weights assigned to events are an inverse S-shaped function compared to the given probability distribution, (see for instance, Gonzalez and Wu (1999) and Abdellaoui (2000) ). This can be explained by insensitivity of perception in the middle of the range. For instance, the change from a probability of 0.55 to 0.60 is not perceived as great as the change from 0 to 0.05.
If probabilities are not known, a similar phenomena has been found (see, Kilka and Weber (2001) ). Individuals overweight highly unlikely events and underweight likely events. (In this case the likelihood of events is subjective.) This produces a pattern of decision weights like that illustrated in Figure  2 . The curved line represents the decision weights of a typical experimental subject and the 45 o line represents SEU beliefs for comparison. This diagram is based on observations that subjects are willing to take courses of action, which yield high outcomes in unlikely events but refuse to accept even a small chance of bad outcomes. The more unfamiliar the source of uncertainty is the lower is the elevation of the curve, i.e. the curve shifts downwards in less familiar situations. This can be interpreted as an e¤ect of ambiguity. Kilka and Weber (2001) report an experimental study of choices in …nancial markets, which was able to distinguish beliefs from decision weights. They found that decision weights deduced from actual choices were markedly nonadditive. Moreover the weighting scheme of a neo-additive capacity provides a simple version of an inverse-S shaped function relating beliefs, p; to decision weights, w(p): This weighting scheme is illustrated in Figure 3 . It can be seen as a piecewise linear approximation to that in Figure 2 . Kilka and Weber (2001) used their data to estimate degrees of optimism and ambiguity separately. In terms of our notation, they report the following values: The values of both optimism and ambiguity vary around 0:5 with deviations of 0:1.
In this paper we shall provide an explanation for evidence on behaviour in games by assuming that individuals have CEU preferences with parameters compatible with the experimental data from Kilka and Weber (2001) . Their evidence suggests that we should consider 0:4 6 6 0:62 and 0:41 6 6 0:61: We say that if and satis…es these inequalities that they lie in the KWrange.
2.3 Equilibrium under Ambiguity
We shall use a solution concept based on Dow and Werlang (1994) .
7 Formally, we assume that each player maximizes his/her expected payo¤ with respect to a non-additive belief. In equilibrium, beliefs have to be reasonable in the sense that each player "believes" that the opponents play best responses. To model this we require that the support of any given player's beliefs contain only best responses of the other players. Denote by R i ( i ) = arg maxfV i (s i ; i ) j s i 2 S i g the best response correspondence of player i; given beliefs represented by the capacity i on S i : Most theories of ambiguity are formulated for single person decisions. To study ambiguity in games it is necessary to extend them to allow for the interactions between di¤erent decision-makers. In the absence of ambiguity, each player is assumed to choose a strategy which maximizes his/her expected payo¤ with respect to beliefs which are compatible with the strategies of their opponents. Most equilibrium notions rest on some degree of consistency between actual behaviour and beliefs, since players are likely to adapt their beliefs if they observe behaviour which contradicts them. In the presence of ambiguity, perfect consistency is unlikely since there do not exist non-additive randomizing devices, which prevents us from constructing strategies, corresponding precisely to ambiguous beliefs. We consider games where each player believes that the strategy choice of his/her opponents is possibly ambiguous.
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An equilibrium is a situation where players behave optimally relative to their beliefs. 6 In the present paper we shall assume that and are distributed independently. We believe independence to be a reasonable approximation. In any event, it is not possible to estimate the joint distribution from the data in Kilka and Weber (2001) .
7 Dow and Werlang (1994) assumed ambiguity-aversion. Their solution concept was later generalized to an arbitrary number of players in Eichberger and Kelsey (2000) and extended to include optimistic behaviour in Eichberger and Kelsey (2009). Lo (1999) presents a re…nement of the Dow-Werlang equilibrium and relates it to the lexicographic preferences of Blume et al (1991) . Jungbauer and Ritzberger (2011) argue in favour of a set-based solution concept for games with ambiguity.
8 There are other possible modelling choices, for instance, one could consider the case where there is ambiguity about the opponents'type.
De…nition 1 A pair of capacities = h 1 ; 2 i is an Equilibrium Under Ambiguity (EUA) if ? 6 = supp 1 R 1 ( 2 ) and ? 6 = supp 2 R 1 ( 1 ): 9 If s i 2 supp i for i = 1; 2; we say that s = hs 1 ; s 2 i is an equilibrium strategy pro…le. If supp i contains a single strategy pro…le for 1 = 1; 2 we say that it is a pure equilibrium, otherwise we say that it is mixed.
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A mixed equilibrium, where the support contains multiple strategy pro…les, should be interpreted as an equilibrium in beliefs rather than randomizations.
Support of Ambiguous Beliefs
There is more than one way to extend the notion of support from probability distributions to capacities. This de…nition determines how tight the relationship between beliefs and actual behaviour is. De…nition 2 requires the strategies in the support of a player's equilibrium belief be best responses. However it is ambiguous whether the opponent plays best responses. As result, in addition, the best and worst possible plays by one's opponent are taken into account when evaluating a strategy. Decision-relevant strategies outside the support can be interpreted as events a player views as unlikely but which, due to ambiguity cannot be completely ruled out.
Several solution concepts for games with strategic ambiguity have been suggested, (see for instance Marinacci (2000) and Lo (1996) ). The main di¤er-ence between these solution concepts is that they use di¤erent support notions. Thus the de…nition of support deserves careful consideration.
De…nition 2 We de…ne the support of the neo-additive capacity ( j ; ; ) by supp = supp :
As explained above a neo-additive capacity is intended to represent a situation where the decision-maker's belief is represented by the additive probability distribution but (s)he is not fully con…dent in this belief. Given this it is plausible that the support of should coincide with that of : Eichberger and Kelsey (2009) show that, for a neo-additive capacity ( j ; ; );
where P is the set of probability distributions de…ned in equation (1). 11 Much of the existing literature on ambiguity in games has explicitly or implicitly 9 Existence of equilibrium can be proved in a standard way using …xed-point theorems, see Dow and Werlang (1994) , Eichberger and Kelsey (2000) and Eichberger et al (2009) . 1 0 Our aim is to modify Nash equilibrium by allowing for the possibility that players may view their opponent's behaviour as ambiguous. If beliefs were additive, then in a 2-player game, De…nition 1 would coincide with Nash equilibrium. In this sense we have modi…ed Nash equilibrium to allow for ambiguity. 1 1 This de…nition is a special case of the inner support notion in Ryan (1997) .
restricted attention to the case of pessimistic players. In the present paper, an important part of our explanation of behaviour in experimental games relies to a large extent on optimistic responses to ambiguity. It is, therefore, necessary to reconsider the support notions put forth in the previous literature. For a more detailed discussion of the relation of our proposal to earlier support notions see Eichberger and Kelsey (2009) .
EXPERIMENTAL GAMES
Goeree and Holt (2001) present evidence that NE is a good predictor in some games but not others. In particular they consider …ve simultaneous move games, in which there is evidence in favour of NE. However, in each case, a seemingly irrelevant parameter change produces the opposite result. In this section we argue that much of this evidence can be explained by ambiguity. For expository reasons we shall discuss the experiments in a di¤erent order to GH. To avoid undue repetition, we shall discuss the …rst game in detail and discuss the remaining cases more brie ‡y.
The Kreps Game
The impact of ambiguity is illustrated by the Kreps game, which is an asymmetric coordination game with a safe strategy for Player 2, NN.
12 The normal form of the game is described in the following matrix: The numbers in brackets denote the number of subjects playing the respective strategies in GH's experiment. The only two Nash equilibria in pure strategies are hT; Li and hB; Ri. There is also a mixed strategy equilibrium, in which Player 2 chooses M and L each with positive probability. The only strategy not played in any NE is NN. In stark contrast, over two thirds of subjects chose NN. Interestingly, this game shows another behavioural feature not mentioned in GH. Given the strong incentive of Player 2 to choose NN, Player 1 could be expected to play the best reply B. This is, however, not the case for the majority of subjects in GH's experiment. We claim that these results can be explained by ambiguity and are compatible with the estimated values of and : For player 2, strategy NN gives a certain pay-o¤ of 30, even with ambiguity. Pessimistic responses to ambiguity can motivate him to choose NN; since all the other strategies can potentially yield a much lower pay-o¤. Suppose that he has an ambiguous belief that player 1 will play s 1 ; where s 1 can either take the values T or B; then the Choquet expected utility of his other strategies is given by:
(1 ) 300 6 30;
(1 ) 145 6 30;
(1 ) 290 6 30; The observed behaviour of more than two thirds of Player 1's choosing T , can be obtained as an equilibrium under ambiguity, 1 (T ) = 2 (NN) = 1; but never as a NE. Assuming 2 is believed to play NN; the CEU value of pay-o¤s for Player 1 are:
Thus T; is preferred to B if and only if 150 (1 )20 > 0 , 1 > 2 15 = 0:13: This inequality is satis…ed for all ; in the KW-range. Hence, with the experimentally observed parameter values for and ; there is a unique equilibrium under ambiguity with equilibrium strategies, hT; NNi :
In Game A, 2 3 of the subjects play the strategy NN; which is not part of any NE. This is clear evidence of a deviation from NE. A possible explanation of this is Loss Aversion, see Kahneman et al (1991) . This refers to the fact that individuals avoid taking actions which potentially could result in losing money. Loss aversion is in addition to conventional risk aversion, which can arise even when all pay-o¤s are positive. Note that NN is the only strategy for player 2 which does not potentially lead to a negative pay-o¤. Hence Loss Aversion could potentially be a reason why 68% of subjects choose NN in Game A: Game B; is similar to Game A except that 300 has been added to all payo¤s. This change does not a¤ect the set of Nash equilibria nor does it a¤ect the set of EUA.
Game B
Player 2 Player 1 No strategy in Game B can yield losses. 14 If signi…cantly less players had played NN in Game B than in Game A, this would have been evidence that play of NN in the Game A was due to loss aversion. In fact adding the constant had little e¤ect on the behaviour of player 2. This suggests that ambiguity-aversion is a more likely explanation for playing NN.
The "Treasure" treatment of the Kreps game is as follows. The pay-o¤s from the strategy combination hB; Ri have been substantially increased. This does not a¤ect the set of Nash equilibria. It does vastly increase the number of players using the Nash equilibrium strategies B and R:
The following argument shows that this result is also compatible with EUA. Consider …rst player 1: Suppose that she believes that player 2 will play R; then her (Choquet) expected utility from her two strategies are V 1 (T ) = 200 (1 ) 250 (1 ) 250 and V 1 (B) = 350 + (1 ) 350: It can be seen that B will be preferred to T for any and ; 0 6 6 1; 0 6 6 1: Now suppose that player 2 believes that 1 will play B: Then his Choquet expected utility from his strategies is:
(1 ) 100 (1 ) 100; V 2 (NN) = 30; V 2 (R) = 400
(1 ) 250 + (1 ) 400: First note that R will be preferred to L and M for any ; : For R to be preferred to NN we require: 40 (1 ) 25 + (1 ) 40 > 3 , 0:57 = 37 65 > (1 ) : All values of ; within the KW-range are compatible with this inequality and hence hB; Ri is the unique equilibrium under ambiguity of Game C for parameter values in this range.
The Traveller's Dilemma
In the Traveller's Dilemma, each player makes a claim n i for a payment between 180 and 300 cents, i.e., n i 2 S := f180; 181; 182; :::; 298; 299; 300g:
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Given two claims (n 1 ; n 2 ); both players obtain the minimum minfn 1 ; n 2 g; but, if the claims are not equal, the player with the higher claim pays R > 1 to the other, yielding the payo¤ function: u i (n 1 ; n 2 ) = minfn 1 ; n 2 g + R sign(n j n i ); with i; j 2 f1; 2g and i 6 = j:
It is easy to see that for R > 1 each player has an incentive to undercut the opponent's claim by one unit. Figure 4 shows the best-reply of Player 1: Hence, for any R > 1; claiming the minimum amount, (n 1 ; n 2 ) = (180; 180); is the unique NE. In fact, n i = 180 is the only rationalizable strategy for each player, since it is the only strategy which cannot be undercut by the opponent. GH show, however, that the experimental results, depend on R: For large R; players claim 180; or close to this amount, as predicted by the NE. For R = 180; almost 80 percent of the subjects chose n i 6 185: In contrast to the NE predictions, for small R; players made claims close to 300; i.e., for R = 5; almost 80 percent of the players chose n > 295.
The evidence can be explained by ambiguity as follows. In the Traveller's Dilemma, pay-o¤s are high if players coordinate on a high claim. As a result there are two strategies which are potentially best responses to an action by one's opponent. Either one can undercut by one unit or alternatively one can choose 299, which may yield the highest coordination gain and maintains at least the chance to avoid the penalty. For R = 180 however, the penalty for being the highest bidder is extreme, wiping out any possible gain from coordination. Hence, even a small amount of pessimism in response to ambiguity will deter players from making a high claim and the only possible equilibrium is where both claim 180: In contrast, for R = 5; the penalty is so low that a little ambiguity and optimism, 1 > 0:1; su¢ ces to make it worthwhile to claim 299. Figure 5 illustrates the equilibrium best-reply correspondence. There is a mixed equilibrium with two best responses 299 and n: For example, if = 0:4 and = 0:6, the ambiguous beliefs that one's opponent would choose [n] = 285 would be 0:18 and the belief for 299 would equal 0:82: The observation, that 80 percent of subjects chose a claim higher than 295; seems to be not obviously incompatible with EUA for these values of and : This analysis is summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose players' beliefs are given by a neo-additive capacity with parameters ; in the KW-range.
1. For R = 180; in the unique symmetric EUA both players have beliefs with support n i = 180: For each player i, n i = 180 is the unique best response. 
Matching Pennies
In experiments on the Matching Pennies game, GH discover that subjects tend to conform with NE predictions if the game is symmetric, but deviate systematically if the pay-o¤s are asymmetric. They study the following two versions of matching pennies. 17 The ratios to the left of the strategies indicate the unique NE mixed strategies and the bold numbers to the right of the strategies show the percentage of subjects choosing the respective strategy in the experiments. The games di¤er only in the payo¤ of Player 1 for hT; Li ; which is indicated by a bold-face number. In mixed-strategy NE, the probabilities, which a given player uses to randomize, are chosen to make his/her opponent indi¤erent between all of his/her equilibrium strategies. Thus NE predicts that a change in player 1's payo¤ will leave her own behaviour unchanged, while causing a change in the behaviour of player 2.
Actual play reveals a quite di¤erent pattern. While the relative frequency of strategy choices in Game D corresponds to the NE prediction, they deviate dramatically from the predictions in the asymmetric game. In Game E, Player 1's choose almost exclusively strategy T; the payo¤ of which has been increased. As a result they make their behaviour predictable, which is exploited by the subjects in the role of Player 2. 18 It is surprising that Player 1 does not appear to foresee this shift in the behaviour of her opponent. It appears as if Player 2 understands the change in Player 1's incentives better than she does herself. One interpretation of Player 1's behaviour may be a shift in decision weights to extremely attractive albeit unlikely events.
Ambiguity makes little di¤erence to game D. Symmetry implies that the only equilibrium is where each player believes that his/her opponent is equally likely to use either strategy. In game E, optimistic responses to ambiguity cause player 1 to overweight unlikely events which yield the high payo¤ 320. This causes her to choose strategy T almost exclusively. From Player 2's point of view, the two strategies are symmetric. However 1 has a bias in favour of T: Hence R is a best response for 2. Thus for the parameter values we …nd in Kilka and Weber's experiments, there is an equilibrium with ambiguity where the equilibrium strategy combination is hT; Ri : (For details see the appendix.) There is no NE which describes such behaviour. There is a unique NE, where Player 2 plays (L) = This discussion is summarised in the following proposition, which is proved in the appendix.
Proposition 2 Suppose players's beliefs are given by a neo-additive capacity with parameters ; in the KW-range.
1. In game D there is a unique EUA where each player is believed to be equally likely to use either strategy i.e. 1 (T ) = 1 (B) and 2 (L) = 2 (R) : 2. In game E there is a unique EUA in which T is the best response of player 1 and R is the best response of player 2:
3.4 A Coordination Game with a Secure Option GH study two coordination games, which have been modi…ed by giving Player 2 an extra secure option. Both of these games have two NEs, hL; Li and hH; Hi : The data suggests that in Game F subjects are nearly all playing the hH; Hi equilibrium. In game G the majority of the subjects are still playing the hH; Hi equilibrium, while a signi…cant minority have switched to other strategies.
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For this experiment we are not able to make a precise prediction since both games have multiple equilibria with and without ambiguity. However we shall show that the results agree in a qualitative sense with EUA. The following proposition shows that while in Game F; hH; Hi is an equilibrium for all parameters values in the KW-range, in Game G this equilibrium only exists for some parameters in this range. Thus in moving from Game F to Game G one would expect some subjects to switch from H to another strategy. It is not possible to predict how many subjects will switch without more details of the distribution of and : Unless the distributions of the parameters are concentrated at the upper ends of their ranges, only a minority of subjects would switch. Thus the theoretical prediction agrees with the experimental results at least qualitatively.
Proposition 3 For the coordination game with a secure option:
1. In game F both hH; Hi and hL; Li are EUA for all parameters in the KWrange; 2. In game G; (a) hH; Hi is an EUA for ; in the KW-range provided 0:82 > 1 ; (b) hL; Li is an EUA for all parameters in the KW-range.
Whether the hH; Hi equilibrium exists in game G depends on the parameter = 1 : KW's evidence shows that 0:28 6 6 0:97: For illustrative purposes assume that is uniformly distributed on this range. Then for 21% of subjects, the hH; Hi equilibrium will not exist in Game G. This is qualitatively similar to the experimental results, where 36% play L in Game G. We have two possible explanations for the discrepancy between 21% and 36%. Firstly it could be that is not uniformly distributed. Secondly subjects may perceive co-ordination games to be more ambiguous than KW's single person decisions, (i.e. is larger than in the KW experiment). This is not implausible since the presence of multiple equilibria means that even if one believes one's opponent will play an equilibrium strategy it is not clear which one. Moreover there is no natural way to assign probabilities to the di¤erent equilibria. If in addition it is not clear whether one's opponents will play an equilibrium strategy, ambiguity will be increased still further.
A Minimum-E¤ort Coordination Game
The minimum e¤ort coordination game was introduced by Huyck et al (1990) , (it is also know as the weakest link model of public goods, see Cornes and Sandler (1996) ). In this model, provision of the public good is equal to the minimum of the individual contributions. This is in contrast to a standard model in which provision of the public good depends on the sum of the individual contributions. An example would be a number of military commanders defending a frontier, where the enemy will choose the most favourable point at which point to attack.
In the game, two players have to choose e¤ort levels from the set E = f110; :::; 170g at a marginal cost of c < 1 yielding pay-o¤s u i (e 1 ; e 2 ) := minfe 1 ; e 2 g c e i ; for i = 1; 2: GH ran this experiment with the marginal cost parameters 0:1 and 0:9 and observed the following distributions of play: The observations show a clear concentration of play on high e¤ort levels in the case of low costs, c = 0:1; and on the low ones for high costs, c = 0:9: Coordinating on any of the six possible e¤ort levels is a NE for either possible value of costs i.e., the set of NE's is f(e 1 ; e 2 ) 2 E 2 j e 1 = e 2 g: Thus NE is unable to explain why an increase in the cost parameter changes behaviour. Since the experiments were one-shot games and there were many possible equilibria, coordination is not very likely.
We shall argue that such observations can be explained by ambiguity. In this game, the best outcome is that your opponent plays the highest possible strategy. Suppose there is an equilibrium with ambiguity in which both players coordinate on an e¤ort level other than the highest. If Player 1 increases her e¤ort by one unit, the perceived marginal bene…t is at least ; which is the weight on the highest outcome. The marginal cost of increasing e¤ort is c: Thus if > c it is always in her interest to increase her contribution. Player 2 will think similarly. Hence if > c the only possible equilibrium is where both players make the highest contribution.
Suppose there is an equilibrium with ambiguity in which both players use an e¤ort level other than the lowest (i.e. 110). If Player 1 decreases her contribution by one unit the perceived marginal reduction in bene…t is at most + (1 ) ; (this is the sum of the decision weight on the worst outcome and the equilibrium outcome.) The marginal cost saving is c: Thus if c > + (1 ) it is worth decreasing e¤ort, which implies that the only possible equilibrium is where both players coordinate on the lowest e¤ort level.
If and lie in the KW-range we have 0:38 > > 0:16, which implies c > 0 for c = 0:1: Similarly Kilka and Weber's experiment implies 0:85 > + (1 ) > 0:64 and hence c > [ + (1 )] for c = 0:9: For marginal costs of 0:1; equilibrium with ambiguity predicts that players would try to coordinate on the highest e¤ort level, while for c = 0:9 they should coordinate on the lowest e¤ort level. The observed behaviour seems to correspond reasonably well with this prediction.
COMPETING EXPLANATIONS
For economic theory, the notion of a Nash equilibrium is attractive. If the pay-o¤s of players are common knowledge, NE identi…es strategy combinations which leave no incentives for individual players to change their behaviour as long as the opponents'follow their equilibrium strategy. Thus, it combines two key ideas:
(i) Players choose the best strategy given their beliefs about the behaviour of the opponents;
(ii) Beliefs about the behaviour of the opponents are correct.
In order to infer their opponents' behaviour in one-shot games, however, players need to know the incentives of these opponents. Whether the pay-o¤s of a player re ‡ect the incentives of this player correctly is however questionable. Attitudes towards risk and ambiguity may matter, just as social attitudes like preferences for fairness, altruism or spite may a¤ect behaviour.
The regularities of behaviour recorded in GH's experiments challenge the idea that the interaction of subjects in a one-shot game can be appropriately described by Nash-equilibrium. Yet, as the treasure treatments show, NE does seem to work well for some payo¤ constellations.
There are several responses to the challenge posed by these experimental results. One may take into account additional aspects of preferences, one may relax the assumption that players maximize an objective function, or one may give up the idea of consistency between beliefs and actual behaviour. Examples of the …rst approach include fairness-based payo¤ transformations in the spirit of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Rabin (1993) and the EUA approach suggested in the present paper. The Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) proposed by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) provides an example for the second type of response. QRE assumes that players play mixed strategies which assign probabilities to the pure strategies based on the relative expected payo¤ obtained with them.
21 McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) show that QRE can be viewed as a Bayesian equilibrium of a game of imperfect information with payo¤ uncertainty. 22 In contrast to models which explicitly assume a bias in the payo¤ evaluation, QRE does not suggest a reason for the particular error structure assumed. The third group of responses is represented by the Cognitive Hierarchy Model (CHM) of Camerer et al (2004) . Building on the level-k optimality model proposed by Stahl and Wilson (1995) this approach abandons the notion of equilibrium. It assumes a distribution of player types characterised by di¤erent levels of rationality. These di¤erent levels of rationality remain unrelated to the actual behaviour of players.
For the asymmetric Matching-Pennies game, Boylan and Grant (2006) consider fairness-based payo¤ transformations in the spirit of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Rabin (1993) . They show, however, that such preferences do not predict the observed behaviour. In contrast, they …nd that the QRE can explain the experimental data of Goeree and Holt (2001) . To the best of our knowledge there exists no study comparing these approaches. It appears however likely that all of them will explain the observed data better than NE since they all add more parameters. EUA adds parameters for ambiguity and ambiguity-attitude, QRE adds a sensitivity parameter and CHM allows for arbitrary levels of rationality. If these parameters can be adjusted freely, it is not surprising that a superior …t to the data can be achieved.
A better test requires constraints on these new parameters. In our opinion, this is the main advantage of the EUA. Ambiguity and ambiguity-attitudes have been studied in large numbers of non-interactive decision-making experiments. From these studies we can obtain additional constraints for the parameters and : As we have shown in this paper, estimates of these parameters from the range obtained in many experiments seem to su¢ ce to explain the observed behaviour in games. Ideally, one would want to assess these parameters from the participants of the game-theoretic experiments. For instance, one could run pretests in which subjects' choices in Ellsberg-type problems reveal their ambiguity attitude, before they interact with others. Neither QRE nor CHM o¤er such possibilities because the parameters of "sensitivity" and "level of rationality"lack an interpretation outside the given game. They just measure the deviation from full rationality embodied in the Nash equilibrium concept.
All these approaches are more ‡exible in describing actual behaviour than NE and therefore will provide a better …t for experimental data. We believe that EUA may be given a more attractive interpretation. Ambiguity-attitude, optimism and pessimism, can be viewed as personal characteristics, which we may take as given, like a player's preferences. Ambiguity, on the other hand, is more situation-dependent. In particular, one would predict that a one-shot game is, by nature, more ambiguous than later rounds of a repeated game. Hence, there are testable hypotheses regarding EUA, which have no counterpart in QRE and CHM. Moreover, there is substantial evidence on individual behaviour, which allows one to predict the attitude of a decision-maker towards ambiguity. Such evidence can help to restrict behaviour in EUA, which makes the theory more powerful. It is a particular strength of EUA that it can explain the behaviour in many di¤erent games with the same set of parameters. The hypothesis that players view their opponents'actions as ambiguous, produces some quite precise comparative static predictions, which could in principle be tested experimentally.
For economic analysis, it is desirable to have a model with parameters which one can interpret behaviourally and which include the "full rationality" of a Nash equilibrium as a special case. While Nash equilibrium can be obtained as a limiting case in all these models, a behavioural interpretation can be given only in the context of the fairness approach of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and the EUA. Since the parameters of QRE and CHM are harder to interpret, it appears also more di¢ cult to use these concepts in economic analysis.
Schmutzler (2008) also studies some of the GH treasures. He shows that if a game has strategic complementarity and increasing di¤erences then the comparative statics are predictable. This result is used to explain the comparative static results in 7 of the ten treasures. However he does not attempt to predict point outcomes in any single experiment.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we have shown that many of GH's treasures of game theory can be explained as responses to ambiguity. We have shown that four of the …ve Treasures can be explained by the hypothesis that subjects have CEU preferences with parameters in the KW-range. In the coordination game with a secure option there are multiple equilibria with and without ambiguity. Thus it is not possible to make a point prediction. However the shift in behaviour between Games F and G appears, at least in qualitative terms to be compatible with our model of ambiguity in games.
We have only analysed those treasures based on normal form games. The other experiments concern dynamic games some of which also have incomplete information. To study the impact of ambiguity in these cases it would be necessary to develop new solution concepts for such games. This is beyond the scope of the present paper. Nevertheless we believe that explanations based on ambiguity could be found for many of these games as well. For instance, the treasure from GH entitled 'Should you believe a threat that is not credible'is similar to the model of frivolous lawsuits in Eichberger and Kelsey (2004) .
The preferences we use have the e¤ect of over weighting the best and worst outcomes. It is likely that ambiguity-aversion would cause other bad outcomes to be over weighted. Similarly optimism might have the e¤ect that a number of good outcomes are over-weighted rather than just the best outcome. While this objection may have some merits in general, the games studied in this paper typically have salient best and worst outcomes. It does not seem implausible that subjects should focus on these outcomes. In Eichberger and Kelsey (2009) we show that much of our analysis can be extended to the more general case where a number of good and bad outcomes are over-weighted. 
A.1 The Traveller's Dilemma
Consider Player 1: Suppose she holds beliefs which are represented by a neo-additive capacity: (Aj ; ; ) = + (1 ) (A): Given these beliefs, Player 1's Choquet expected utility from the choice of n 1 is V 1 (n 1 ; ; ; ) = max
Lemma 1 Suppose Player 1's beliefs are given by a neo-additive capacity ( j ; ; n 2 ): If and lie in the KW-range then the best-reply correspondence is R 1 ( ( j ; ; n 2 )) = Proof First note since R > 1, n 1 = 299 weakly dominates n 1 = 300; moreover, for ; > 0; n 1 = 300 is strictly dominated: To see this note that the highest pay-o¤ for n 1 = 299 is greater than that for n 1 = 300; and the highest payo¤ gets positive weight in the Choquet integral. (Given our assumptions on and :) Thus we may eliminate the possibility that either player plays strategy 300:
Consider n 2 = 180: The CEU of a pure strategy n 1 can be computed as, 2 3 V 1 (n 1 ; ; ;
Consider next n 2 2 (180; 300): The CEU of a pure strategy combination (n 1 ; n 2 ) is,
(ii) For n 2 = 180; V 1 (n 1 ; ; ; 180 ) is strictly increasing in n 1 in the range 299 > n 1 > 180: Hence, Consider now n 2 2 (180; 300): For n 1 2 (180; n 2 ) [ (n 2 ; 300) the CEU value is strictly increasing in n 1 : Hence, only n 1 = 180; n 1 = n 2 1; n 1 = n 2 ; or n 1 = 299 can be best responses to n 2 .
(a)
Comparing n 1 = n 2 1 and n 1 = n 2 , we observe that:
holds, for R > 1 + : For R = 5 and R = 180; this condition is satis…ed. Hence, n 1 = n 2 cannot be a best reply.
(b)
Comparing n 1 = 180 and n 1 = 299: (b1) Suppose 181 6 n 2 6 298; then we observe that V 1 (299; ; ; n 2 ) V 1 (180; ; ; By the assumption 0:28 6 1 6 0:97; we obtain for R = 5; 180 > 180+2 5 0:28 119 > 180+2R 1 119: Hence, for R = 5; V 1 (299; ; ; n 2 ) > V 1 (180; ; ; n 2 ) for all n 2 > 180:
Moreover, for R = 180; we …nd that 180 + 2R 1 119 > 180 + 2 180 0:97 119 > 300: Thus, V (180; ; ; n 2 ) > V (299; ; ; n 2 ) in this case.
(b2) For n 2 = 299; V 1 (299; ; ; 299 ) V 1 (180; ; ; 299 )
For R = 5, this condition is satis…ed, hence, n 1 = 299 is the best reply to a belief concentrated on n 2 = 299: For R = 180; 119 1 + 1 119 (1 + 0:28) < 180 = R: Hence, V 1 (299; ; ; 299 ) < V 1 (180; ; ; 299 ):
(c) Comparing n 1 = n 2 1 with n 1 = 299:
For n 2 = 299; we obtain V 1 (298; ; ; 299 ) V 1 (299; ; ;
( 1) + (1 ) (R 1) R 0 as R R 1 + 1 : From 1 6 0:97 we have R > 1 + 1 for R > 2: Thus, n 1 = 298 is the best reply to 299: (c2) For n 2 < 299; we obtain V 1 (n 2 1; ; ; n 2 ) V 1 (299; ; ;
thus V 1 (n 2 1; ; ; n 2 ) R V 1 (299; ; ; n 2 ) as n 2 R 300 1 (2R 1) =: n( ; ; R):
Hence, R 1 ( ( j ; ; n 2 )) = The following proposition yields the symmetric equilibrium under ambiguity of this game. The notation [x] denotes the smallest integer larger or equal to x: For ease of notation, we will suppress the arguments of the function n( ; ; R) and will write n for its value.
Proposition 4 Suppose the conditions of Lemma 1 are satis…ed.
1. For R = 180; in the unique symmetric EUA both players have beliefs:
(180) = 1:
In response, both players choose n 1 = n 2 = 180: 2. For R = 5; in the unique symmetric EUA both players have beliefs: In response, both players choose n 1 ; n 2 2 f[n] ; 299g:
Proof The equilibrium beliefs of an EUA must make players indi¤erent between claiming [n] and 299: Clearly, all strategies which are not best responses will be played with probability zero. Hence, we can set 
T will be preferred to B for any beliefs about player 2's behaviour (i.e. T will be a best response whatever the value of 1 (L)). Provided and are in the KW-range, 1 6
6 0:27 6 1 6 0:97; inequality (2) will hold.
In equilibrium, player 2's beliefs must satisfy 2 (B) = 0; which implies: Hence L is a best response for player 2 for 0 < 6 1; 0 < < 1: Thus it follows that for parameters in the KW-range, Game E has a unique equilibrium with ambiguity in which 1 plays T and 2 plays R:
A.3 A Coordination Game with a Secure Option
Proof of Proposition 3
Conditions for hH; Hi to be an equilibrium in Game F Suppose that player 2 'believes' player 1 will play H; i.e. H is the support of his beliefs. Then her (Choquet) expected utility is: V 2 (H) = 180 + (1 ) 180; V 2 (L) = 90 and V 2 (S) = 40: V 2 (H) > V 2 (L) for all ; , 0 6 6 1; 0 6 6 1: V 2 (H) > V 2 (S) () 9 + (1 ) 9 > 2: One can check this inequality holds for all in the KW range.
Suppose that player 1 'believes' player 2 will play H; then her (Choquet) expected utility is: V 1 (H) = 180 + (1 ) 180 and V 1 (L) = 90: Hence V 1 (H) > V 1 (L) for all ; , 0 < 6 1; 0 < 6 1:
Conditions for hL; Li to be an equilibrium in Game F Suppose that player 2 'believes'player 1 will play L: Then his (Choquet) expected utility is: V 2 (H) = 180; V 2 (L) = 90 + (1 ) 90 and V 2 (S) = 40: Thus V 2 (L) > V 2 (S) () 9 + (1 ) 9 > 4 and V 2 (L) > V 2 (H) () + (1 ) > 2 () 1 > 1 : One can check that both of these inequalities hold for all in the KW range. Suppose that player 1 'believes' player 2 will play L: Then her (Choquet) expected utility is: V 1 (H) = 180 + (1 ) 180 and V 1 (L) = 90: Hence V 1 (L) > V 1 (H) for all ; such that 0 < 6 1; 0 < 6 1:
Conditions for hH; Hi to be an equilibrium in Game G Suppose that player 1 'believes' player 2 will play H: Then her (Choquet) expected utility is: V 1 (H) = 180 + (1 ) 180 and V 1 (L) = 400: For H to be a best response we require: 9 + (1 ) 9 > 20 or 0:82 = 9 11
Suppose that player 2 'believes'player 1 will play H: Then H will be a best response for player 2 whenever the parameters are in the KW range. The reasoning for Game F applies here since the pay-o¤s of player 2 are the same in the two games.
Conditions for hL; Li to be an equilibrium in Game G Suppose that player 1 'believes'player 2 will play L: Then her (Choquet) expected utility is: V 1 (H) = 180 and V 1 (L) = 400 + (1 ) 90: Hence V 1 (L) > V 1 (H) for all ; such that 0 < 6 1; 0 < 6 1:
If player 2 'believes'player 1 will play L; then L is a best response for player 2 whenever the parameters are in the KW-range. As before the reasoning for Game F applies here. Thus hL; Li is an equilibrium in Game G for all in the KW range.
